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Abstract
We study the (nearly) optimal mechanisms in (, δ)-approximate differential privacy for integer-valued query functions and
vector-valued (histogram-like) query functions under a utility-maximization/cost-minimization framework. We characterize the
tradeoff between  and δ in utility and privacy analysis for histogram-like query functions (`1 sensitivity), and show that the
(, δ)-differential privacy is a framework not much more general than the (, 0)-differential privacy and (0, δ)-differential privacy
in the context of `1 and `2 cost functions, i.e., minimum expected noise magnitude and noise power. In the same context of `1
and `2 cost functions, we show the near-optimality of uniform noise mechanism and discrete Laplacian mechanism in the high
privacy regime (as (, δ)→ (0, 0)). We conclude that in (, δ)-differential privacy, the optimal noise magnitude and noise power
are Θ(min( 1

, 1
δ
)) and Θ(min( 1
2
, 1
δ2
)), respectively, in the high privacy regime.
I. INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy is a framework to quantify to what extent individual privacy in a statistical database is preserved while
releasing useful statistical information about the database [1]. The basic idea of differential privacy is that the presence of
any individual data in the database should not affect the final released statistical information significantly, and thus it can give
strong privacy guarantees against an adversary with arbitrary auxiliary information. For more background and motivation of
differential privacy, we refer the readers to the survey [2].
The standard approach to preserve -differential privacy for real-valued query function is to perturb the query output by adding
random noise with Laplacian distribution. Recently, Geng and Viswanath [3] show that under a general utility-maximization
framework, for single real-valued query function, the optimal -differentially private mechanism is the staircase mechanism,
which adds noise with staircase distribution to the query output. The optimality of the staircase mechanism is extended to the
multidimensional setting for histogram-like functions in [4], where the sensitivity of the query functions is defined using the `1
metric as in [1]. A relaxed notion of privacy, (, δ)-differential privacy, was introduced by Dwork et al. [5], and the standard
approach to preserving (, δ)-differential privacy is to add Gaussian noise to the query output.
In this work, we study the (nearly) optimal mechanisms in (, δ)-differential privacy for integer-valued query functions and
vector-valued (histogram-like) query functions under a utility-maximization/cost-minimization framework, and characterize the
tradeoff between  and δ in utility and privacy analysis. (, δ)-differential privacy is a relaxed notion of privacy, compared to
the standard -differential privacy introduced in [1]. (, δ)-differential privacy includes as special cases:
• (, 0)-differential privacy; in this standard setting, the optimal mechanism for a general cost minimization framework is
the staircase mechanism as shown in [3] and [4]. In the high privacy regime, the standard discrete Laplacian mechanism
too performs well.
• (0, δ)-differential privacy; this setting requires that the total variation of the conditional probability distributions of the
query output for neighboring datasets should be bounded by δ. In this paper we show that the uniform noise distribution
is near-optimal in the (0, δ)-differential privacy setting for a general class of cost functions.
While the (, δ)-differential privacy setting is more general than the two special cases – (, 0) and (0, δ)-differential privacy
– our main result in this work is to show that it is only more general by very little; this is done in the context of `1 and `2
cost functions. We show the near-optimality of uniform noise and discrete Laplacian mechanisms in the high privacy regime
(as (, δ)→ (0, 0)) for `1 and `2 cost functions.
Our result is a sharp departure from the setting of `∞ sensitivity (modeling adaptive query compositions) where the notion
of (, δ)-approximate differential privacy provides significant variance reductions (in the dimension of the query output), as
compared to the standard (, 0)-differential privacy [1], [6], [7]. Our main result shows that such gains are not available in the
`1 sensitivity model – in fact approximate differential privacy in the usual regime (δ << ) is nearly the same (up to constants,
in added noise magnitude and variance) as regular differential privacy. For completeness, we consider all relationships between
 and δ in this paper.
The near-optimality of the two mechanisms (designed for the special cases of (, 0) and (0, δ) differential privacy settings)
is proved by demonstrating a uniform bound on the ratio between the costs of these two mechanisms and that of the optimal
cost in the (, δ) differential privacy setting in the high privacy regime, i.e., as (, δ)→ (0, 0) for `1 and `2 cost functions.
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2A. Summary of Our Results
In this work we consider a very general model for integer-valued and vector-valued (histogram-like) query functions. Unlike
previous works on (, δ)-differential privacy (e.g., [8], [9], [10]), we impose no assumptions on the dataset model and properties
of the query functions other than the global sensitivity, which is defined using the `1 metric. We implicitly assume that the
local sensitivity is equal to the global sensitivity. Due to the optimality of query-output independent perturbation as shown in
[3], we consider query-output independent perturbation mechanisms.
We summarize our results in the following. Let VLB denote the lower bound we derived for the cost under differential
privacy constraint. Let V LapUB and V
uniform
UB denote the upper bounds for the cost achieved by discrete Laplacian mechanism
and uniform noise mechanism. In this work, we show that
• For integer-valued query functions,
– for (0, δ)-differential privacy with the global sensitivity ∆ = 1, the uniform noise mechanism is optimal for all
generic cost funtions,
– for (0, δ)-differential privacy with arbitrary global sensitivity ∆, limδ→0
V uniformUB
VLB
= 1 for `1 and `2 cost functions,
– for (, δ)-differential privacy with `1 and `2 cost functions, lim(,δ)→(0,0)
min(V
Lap
UB ,V
uniform
UB )
VLB
≤ C for some
numerical constant C.
• For vector-valued (histogram-like) query functions,
– for (0, δ)-differential privacy with the global sensitivity ∆ = 1, the multi-dimensional uniform noise mechanism is
optimal for `1 and `2 cost funtions,
– for (0, δ)-differential privacy with arbitrary global sensitivity ∆, limδ→0
V uniformUB
VLB
= 1 for `1 and `2 cost functions,
– for (, δ)-differential privacy with `1 and `2 cost functions, lim(,δ)→(0,0)
min(V
Lap
UB ,V
uniform
UB )
VLB
≤ C for some
numerical constant C, which is independent of the dimension of the query function.
We conclude that in (, δ)-differential privacy, the optimal noise magnitude and noise power are Θ(min( 1 ,
1
δ )) and Θ(min(
1
2 ,
1
δ2 )),
respectively, in the high privacy regime, and naturally, the total cost grow linearly in terms of the dimension of the query
output.
B. Related Work
Dwork et. al. [1] introduce -differential privacy and show that the Laplacian mechanism, which perturbs the query output
by adding random noise with Laplace distribution proportional to the global sensitivity of the query function, can preserve -
differential privacy. In [1], it is shown that for histogram-like query functions, where the query output has multiple components
and the global sensitivity is defined using the `1 metric, one can perturb each component independently by adding the Laplacian
noise to preserve -differential privacy.
Nissim, Raskhodnikova and Smith [11] show that for certain nonlinear query functions, one can improve the accuracy by
adding data-dependent noise calibrated to the smooth sensitivity of the query function, which is based on the local sensitivity of
the query function. McSherry and Talwar [12] introduce the exponential mechanism to preserve -differential privacy for general
query functions in an abstract setting, where the query function may not be real-valued. Dwork et. al. [5] introduce (, δ)-
differential privacy and show that adding random noise with Gaussian distribution can preserve (, δ)-differential privacy for
real-valued query function. Hall, Rinaldo, and Wasserman [13] study how to preserve (, δ)-differential privacy for releasing
(infinite dimensional) functions, and show that adding Gaussian process noise to the released function can preserve (, δ)-
differential privacy. Kasiviswanathan and Smith [14] study (, δ)-semantic privacy under a Bayesian framework. Chaudhuri
and Mishra [15], and Machanavajjhala et. al. [16] propose different variants of the standard , δ-differential privacy.
Ghosh, Roughgarden, and Sundararajan [17] show that for a single count query with sensitivity ∆ = 1, for a general
class of utility functions, to minimize the expected cost under a Bayesian framework the optimal mechanism to preserve -
differential privacy is the geometric mechanism, which adds noise with geometric distribution. Brenner and Nissim [18] show
that for general query functions no universally optimal mechanisms exist. Gupte and Sundararajan [19] derive the optimal
noise probability distributions for a single count query with sensitivity ∆ = 1 for minimax (risk-averse) users. [19] shows
that although there is no universally optimal solution to the minimax optimization problem in [19] for a general class of cost
functions, each solution (corresponding to different cost functions) can be derived from the same geometric mechanism by
randomly remapping. Geng and Viswanath [3] generalize the results of [17] and [19] to real-valued (and integer-valued) query
functions with arbitrary sensitivity, and show that the optimal query-output independent perturbation mechanism is the staircase
mechanism, which adds noise with a staircase-shaped probability density function (or probability mass function for integer-
valued query function) to the query output. The optimality of the staircase mechanism is extended to the multidimensional
setting for histogram-like functions in [4], where the sensitivity of the query functions is defined using the `1 metric as in [1].
Differential privacy for histogram query functions has been widely studied in the literature, e.g., [8], [20]–[24], and many
existing works use the Laplacian mechanism as the basic tool. For instance, Li et al. [24] introduce the matrix mechanism
3to answer batches of linear queries over a histogram in a differentially private way with good accuracy guarantees. Their
approach is that instead of adding Laplacian noise to the workload query output directly, the matrix mechanism will design
an observation matrix which is the input to the database, from perturbed output (using the standard Laplace mechanism)
estimate the histogram itself, and then compute the query output directly. [24] shows that this two-stage process will preserve
differential privacy and increase the accuracy. Hay et al. [21] show that for a general class of histogram queries, by exploiting
the consistency constraints on the query output, which is differentially private by adding independent Laplace noises, one can
improve the accuracy while still satisfying differential privacy. These existing works study how to efficiently answer a set of
linear queries on the histogram, while our work addresses the problem of releasing the histogram itself, which can be viewed
as the worst-case query release (without knowing which linear queres will be asked).
Hardt and Talwar [22] study the tradeoff between privacy and error for answering a set of linear queries over a histogram
under -differental privacy. The error is defined as the worst expectation of the `2-norm of the noise. [22] derives a lower
bound for the error in the high privacy regime by using tools from convex geometry and Markov’s inequality, and gives an
upper bound by analyzing a differentially private mechanism, K-norm mechanism, which is an instantiation of the exponential
mechanism and involves randomly sampling from a high dimensional convex body. The lower bound given in [22] depends on
the volume of a convex body associated with the lineary query functions, and the lower bound works for arbitrary linear query
functions. In our problem setting, the linear query functions we are studying are the histogram function, which is a speical
case of [22] by setting d = n and setting F to be the identity map function. In this case, the lower bound given in [22] is
Ω(
√
d
 )
1, which matches our result, as we show that for -differental privacy, in the high privacy regime, adding independent
Laplacian noises to each component of the histogram is asymptotically optimal in the context of `1 and `2 cost functions.
Nikolov, Talwar and Zhang [8] extend the result of [22] on answering linear querys over a histogram to the case of (, δ)-
differential privacy. Using tools from discrepancy theory, convex geometry and statistical estimation, they derive lower bounds
and upper bounds of the error, which are within a multiplicative factor of O(log 1δ ) in terms of δ. Their bounds work for any set
of linear query functions over a histogram, while in our work we study only the identity function, i.e., the query output is the
histogram itself. Our result shows that in the high privacy regime (as (, δ)→ (0, 0)), the optimal error scales as Θ(min( 1 , 1δ ))
and Θ(min( 12 ,
1
δ2 )) for `
1 and `2 cost functions, respectively. Therefore, our results significantly improve the bounds in [8]
in terms of  and δ in the high privacy regime where both  and δ go to zero.
Kasiviswanathan, Rudelson, Smith and Ullman [9] derive lower bounds on the noise for releasing contingency tables under
(, δ)-differential privacy constraint, where the lower bounds depend on the size and structure of the database. Our lower
bounds are tighter and sharper than those of [9] in terms of  and δ. For instance, in [9], for (, δ)-differential privacy the
lower bounds are proportional to (1 − δ ), which are zero whenever δ = , while our results show that the lower bound is
Θ(min( 1 ,
1
δ )) as (, δ)→ (0, 0).
Anindya De [10] studies lower bound on the additive noise for Lipschitz query functions in (, δ)-differential privacy which
uses a different metric for the noise, and the lower bound depends on the size of the database. Jain, Kothari, and Thakurta
[25] study how to preserve (, δ)-differential privacy for online learning algorithms, and show that the approximate differential
privacy can be achieved by adding Gaussian noise to each component of the query output. They derive lower bounds on the
noise, and the lower bounds can be viewed as an application of the composition theorem in [7] by Dwork, Rothblum, and
Vadhan, which has been improved by Oh and Viswanath [26] recently. The difference of [25] and other related works from
our work is that the global sensitivity of the query function is defined using `∞ metric in [25] and [7], while in our work we
use `1 metric.
C. Organization
This paper is organized as follows. We formulate the utility-maximization/cost-minimization under the (, δ)-differential
privacy constraint for a single integer-valued query function as a linear programming problem in Section II. In Section III, we
study (0, δ)-differential privacy, and show the nearly optimality of the simple uniform noise mechanism. In Section IV, we
study the optimal mechanisms in (, δ)-differential privacy, and show the optimality of uniform noise mechanism and Laplacian
mechanism in the regime (, δ)→ (0, 0) in the context of `1 and `2 cost functions. In Section V, we extend the results to the
multidimensional setting for histogram-like query functions, where the query output is a vector of integers.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider an integer-valued query function
q : Dn → Z, (1)
where Dn is the domain of the databases.
1Note that for the d-dimensional `1 unit ball, the volume is 2
d
d!
, and thus in Theorem 3.4 of [22], Vol(K)1/d = Θ( 1
d
).
4The sensitivity of the query function q is defined as
∆ , max
D1,D2⊆Dn:|D1−D2|≤1
|q(D1)− q(D2)|, (2)
where the maximum is taken over all possible pairs of neighboring database entries D1 and D2 which differ in at most one
element, i.e., one is a proper subset of the other and the larger database contains just one additional element [2]. Clearly, ∆
is an integer in this discrete setting.
Definition 1 ((, δ)-differential privacy [5]). A randomized mechanism K gives -differential privacy if for all data sets D1
and D2 differing on at most one element, and all S ⊂ Range(K),
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[K(D2) ∈ S] + δ. (3)
A. Operational Meaning of (, δ)-differential privacy in the Context of Hypothesis Testing
As shown by [27], one can interpret the differential privacy constraint (3) in the context of hypothesis testing in terms
of false alarm probability and missing detection probability. Indeed, consider a binary hypothesis testing problem over two
neighboring datasets, H0 : D1 versus H1 : D2, where an individual’s record is in D2 only. Given a decision rule, let S be the
decision region such that when the released output lies in S, H1 will be rejected, and when the released output lies in SC (the
complement of S), H0 will be rejected. The false alarm probability PFA and the missing detection probability PMD can be
written as
PFA = P (K(D1) ∈ SC), (4)
PMD = P (K(D2) ∈ S). (5)
Therefore, from (3) we get
1− PFA ≤ ePMD + δ. (6)
Thus
ePMD + PFA ≥ 1− δ. (7)
Switch D1 and D2 in (3), and we get
Pr[K(D2) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] + δ. (8)
Therefore,
1− PMD ≤ ePFA + δ, (9)
and thus
PMD + e
PFA ≥ 1− δ. (10)
In conclusion, we have
ePMD + PFA ≥ 1− δ, (11)
PMD + e
PFA ≥ 1− δ. (12)
The (, δ)-differential privacy constraint implies that in the context of hypothesis testing, PFA and PMD can not be both
too small.
We plot the regions of PFA and PMD under (, δ)-differential privacy, and under two special cases: (, 0) and (0, δ)-
differential privacy, in Figure 1.
B. Cost-Minimization/Utility-Maximization Formulation
The standard approach to preserving the differential privacy is to add noise to the output of query function. Let q(D) be
the value of the query function evaluated at D ⊆ Dn, the noise-adding mechanism K will output
K(D) = q(D) +X, (13)
where X is the noise added by the mechanism to the output of query function. To make the output of the mechanism be valid,
i.e., q(D) +X ∈ Z, X can only take integer values.
Let P be the probability mass function of the noise X , and use Pi to denote Pr[X = i]. For a set S ⊂ Z, denote Pr[X ∈ S]
by PS .
5(a) (, δ)-Differential Privacy
(b) (, 0)-Differential Privacy (c) (0, δ)-Differential Privacy
Fig. 1: Regions of PMD and PFA in (, δ), (, 0) and (0, δ)-Differential Privacy.
In the following we derive the differential privacy constraint on the probability distribution of X from (3).
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[K(D2) ∈ S] + δ (14)
⇔ Pr[q(D1) +X ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[q(D2) +X ∈ S] + +δ (15)
⇔ PS−q(D1) ≤ exp() PS−q(D2) + δ (16)
⇔ PS′ ≤ exp() PS′+q(D1)−q(D2) + δ, (17)
where S′ , S − q(D1) = {s− q(D1)|s ∈ S}.
Since (3) holds for any set S ⊆ Z, and |q(D1)− q(D2)| ≤ ∆, from (17) we have
PS ≤ exp() PS+d + δ, (18)
for any set S ⊆ Z and for all |d| ≤ ∆.
Consider a cost function L(·) : Z→ R, which is a function of the added noise X . Our goal is to minimize the expectation
6of the cost subject to the (, δ)-differential privacy constraint (18):
V ∗ := min
P
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)P(i) (19)
subject to PS ≤ exp() PS+d + δ, ∀S ⊂ Z, d ∈ Z, |d| ≤ |∆|.
In this work, we restrict our attention to the scenario when the cost function L(k) is symmetric (around k = 0) and
monotonically increasing for k ≥ 0. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we assume L(0) = 0. Using the same argument
in Lemma 28 in [3], we only need to consider symmetric noise probability distributions.
III. (0, δ)-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
We first consider the simple case when  = 0, i.e., (0, δ)-differential privacy. The (0, δ)-differential privacy constraint
requires that the total variation of the conditional probability distributions of the query output for neighboring datasets should
be bounded by δ.
In the differential privacy constraint (18), by choosing the subset S = Sk := {` : ` ≥ k} for k ∈ N and d = ∆, we see that
the noise probability distribution P must satisfy the constraints
∆−1∑
`=0
Pk+` ≤ δ, ∀k ∈ N. (20)
A. ∆ = 1
In the special case ∆ = 1, the constraints in (20) are particularly simple:
pk ≤ δ; ∀k ≥ 0. (21)
For symmetric cost functions L(k) that are monotonically increasing in k ≥ 0, we can now readily argue that the uniform
probability distribution is optimal.
To avoid integer rounding issues, assume 12δ is an integer.
Theorem 1. If ∆ = 1, then
V ∗ =
1
2δ−1∑
k=− 12δ
δL(k), (22)
and the optimal noise probability distribution is
Pk =
{
δ − 12δ ≤ k ≤ 12δ − 1
0 otherwise
(23)
B. General Lower Bound for ∆ ≥ 2
We now turn to understanding (near) optimal (0, δ) privacy mechanisms in terms of minimizing the expected loss when the
sensitivity ∆ ≥ 2.
Recall that in (0, δ)-differential privacy, the minimum cost V ∗ is the result of the following optimization problem, which is
a linear program:
V ∗ := min
+∞∑
k=−∞
L(k)Pk
such that pk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ N
+∞∑
k=−∞
Pk = 1
PS ≤ PS+d + δ, ∀S ⊂ Z, d ∈ Z, |d| ≤ |∆|. (24)
Since L(·) is a symmetric function, we can assume P is a symmetric probability distribution. In addition, we relax the
constraint (24) by choosing d = ∆ and S = Sk for k ∈ N. Then we get a relaxed linear program, the solution of which is a
lower bound for V ∗. More precisely,
7VLB := min 2
∞∑
k=1
L(k)Pk (25)
such that Pk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ N
P0
2
+
∞∑
k=1
Pk ≥ 1
2
(26)
−
∆−1∑
`=0
Pk+` ≥ −δ, ∀k ∈ N. (27)
To avoid integer rounding issues, assume 12δ is a positive integer.
Theorem 2. If
L(1 + ∆
2δ
) ≥ 2
L(1) + 12δ∑
i=1
(L(1 + i∆)− L(i∆))
 , (28)
then
V ∗ ≥ VLB = 2δ
1
2δ−1∑
i=0
L(1 + i∆). (29)
Proof: See Appendix A.
C. Uniform Noise Mechanism
Consider the noise with the uniform probability distribution:
Pk =
{
δ
∆ ∀ − ∆2δ ≤ k ≤ ∆2δ − 1
0 otherwise
(30)
It is readily verified that this noise probability distribution satisfies the (0, δ) differential privacy constraint. Therefore, an
upper bound for V ∗ is
Theorem 3.
V ∗ ≤ VUB , 2
∆
2δ−1∑
i=1
δ
∆
L(i) + δ
∆
L( ∆
2δ
). (31)
D. Comparison of VLB and VUB
We first apply the lower bound (29) and upper bound (31) to `1 and `2 cost functions, i.e., L(i) = |i| and L(i) = i2, in
which V ∗ corresponds to the minimum expected noise amplitude and minimum noise power, respectively.
Note that in the case L(i) = |i|, the condition (28) in Theorem 2 is
∆
2δ
≥ 1
δ
+ 1. (32)
When ∆ ≥ 3, (28) holds.
Corollary 4. For the cost function L(i) = |i|,
VLB =
∆
4δ
+ 1− ∆
2
, (33)
VUB =
∆
4δ
, (34)
and thus the additive gap
VUB − VLB = ∆
2
− 1 (35)
is a constant independent of δ.
8In the case L(i) = i2, the condition (28) in Theorem 2 is
∆
2δ2
(
∆
2
− 1) ≥ 1
δ
+ 1. (36)
When ∆ ≥ 3, (36) holds.
Corollary 5. For the cost function L(i) = i2,
VLB =
∆2
12δ2
− ∆
2
4δ
+ ∆(
1
2δ
− 1) + ∆
2
6
+ 1, (37)
VUB =
∆2
12δ2
+
1
6
, (38)
and thus the multiplicative gap
lim
δ→0
VUB
VLB
= 1. (39)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Corollary 6. Given a positive integer m, consider the cost function L(i) = |i|m. Then
lim
δ→0
VUB
VLB
= 1. (40)
Proof: By induction, it is easy to show that
∑n
i=1 i
m = Θ(n
m+1
m+1 ), and
lim
n→+∞
∑n
i=1 i
m
nm+1
m+1
= 1. (41)
Therefore,
lim
δ→0
VUB
VLB
= lim
δ→0
2 δ∆
∑ ∆
2δ−1
i=1 i
m + δ∆
∆m
(2δ)m
2δ
∑ 1
2δ−1
i=0 (1 + i∆)
m
(42)
= lim
δ→0
2 δ∆
∆m+1
(2δ)m+1
m+1
2δ∆m
( 12δ )
m+1
m+1
(43)
= 1. (44)
For general cost functions, we have the following bound on the multiplicative gap between the lower bound and upper
bound.
Corollary 7. Given a cost function L(·) satisfying
sup
k≥T
L(k)
L(k −∆ + 1) ≤ C, (45)
for some integer T ∈ N, and some positive number C ∈ R, then
lim
δ→0
VUB
VLB
≤ 1 + (1 + 1
2∆
)C. (46)
Proof: See Appendix C.
IV. (, δ)-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Recall that since L(·) is a symmetric function, without loss of generality, we can restrict ourselves to symmetric noise
probability distributions, i.e.,
Pk = P−k,∀k ∈ Z. (47)
The differential privacy constraint in (18) can be understood in some detail by choosing the subset S = Sk := {` : ` ≥ k}
for k ∈ N. In this case we see that the noise probability distribution must satisfy the following constraints. For k = 0 and
d = ∆,
PS0 ≤ ePS∆ + δ. (48)
9By using the symmetry condition in (47) and the fact that
∑+∞
`=−∞ P` = 1, from (48) we get
P0 1 + e

2
+ e
∆−1∑
`=1
P` ≤ δ + e
 − 1
2
. (49)
For k = 1 and d = ∆, we have
PS1 ≤ ePS∆+1 + δ, (50)
and thus
P0 e
 − 1
2
+ e
∆∑
`=1
P` ≤ δ + e
 − 1
2
. (51)
For general k ≥ 2 and d = ∆, we have
PSk ≤ ePS∆+k + δ, (52)
and thus
P0 e
 − 1
2
+ (e − 1)
k−1∑
`=1
P` + e
k+∆−1∑
`=k
P` ≤ δ + e
 − 1
2
. (53)
A. Lower Bound
By restricting the set S in (18) to be Sk := {` : ` ≥ k} for k ∈ Z and restricting d to be ∆, we get the following relaxed
linear program, the solution of which is a lower bound for V ∗:
VLB := min 2
∞∑
k=1
L(k)Pk
such that Pk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ N
P0
2
+
∞∑
k=1
Pk ≥ 1
2
(54)
P0 1 + 

2
+ e
∆−1∑
k=1
Pk ≤ δ + e
 − 1
2
(55)
P0 e
 − 1
2
+ e
∆∑
k=1
Pk ≤ δ + e
 − 1
2
(56)
P0 e
 − 1
2
+ (e − 1)
i−1∑
k=1
Pk + e
i+∆−1∑
k=i
Pk ≤ δ + e
 − 1
2
,∀i ≥ 2. (57)
Define
a ,
δ + e
−1
2
e
, (58)
b , e−. (59)
To avoid integer rounding issues, assume that there exists an integer n such that
n−1∑
k=0
abk =
1
2
. (60)
Theorem 8. If
n−1∑
i=1
e−i(2L(i∆)− L(1 + (i− 1)∆)− L(1 + i∆)) ≥ L(1), (61)
then we have
V ∗ ≥ VLB = 2
n−1∑
k=0
δ + e
−1
2
e
e−kL(1 + k∆). (62)
Proof: See Appendix D.
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B. Upper Bound: Uniform Noise Mechanism and Discrete Laplacian Mechanism
Since (0, δ)-differential privacy implies (, δ)-differential privacy, we can use the uniform noise mechanism with noise
probability distribution defined in (30) to preserve (, δ)-differential privacy, and the corresponding upper bound is
Theorem 9. For (, δ)-differential privacy, we have
V ∗ ≤ V uniformUB = 2
∆
2δ−1∑
i=1
δ
∆
L(i) + δ
∆
L( ∆
2δ
). (63)
On the other hand, if we simply ignore the parameter δ (i.e., set δ = 0), we can use a discrete variant of Laplacian distribution
to satisfy the (, 0)-differential privacy, which implies (, δ)-differential privacy.
More precisely, define λ , e− ∆ .
Theorem 10. The probability distribution P with
pk ,
1− λ
1 + λ
λ|k|,∀k ∈ Z, (64)
satisfies the (, δ)-differential privacy constraint, and the corresonding cost is
+∞∑
k=−∞
pkL(k) = 2
+∞∑
k=1
1− λ
1 + λ
λkL(k). (65)
Corollary 11.
V ∗ ≤ V LapUB , 2
+∞∑
k=1
1− λ
1 + λ
λkL(k) (66)
C. Comparison of Lower Bound and Upper Bound
In this section, we compare the lower bound (62) and the upper bounds V uniformUB and V
Lap
UB for (, δ)-differential privacy
for `1 and `2 cost functions, i.e., L(i) = |i| and L(i) = i2, in which V ∗ corresponds to the minimum expected noise amplitude
and minimum noise power, respectively. We show that the multiplicative gap between the lower bound and upper bound is
bounded by a constant as (, δ)→ (0, 0).
1)  ≤ δ regime: We first compare the gap between the lower bound VLB and the upper bound V uniformUB in the regime
 ≤ δ as δ → 0.
Corollary 12. For the cost function L(k) = |k|, in the regime  ≤ δ, we have
lim
δ→0
V
uniform
UB
VLB
≤ 1
4(1− 2 log 32 )
≈ 1.32 (67)
Proof: See Appendix E.
Corollary 13. For the cost function L(k) = k2, in the regime  ≤ δ, we have
lim
δ→0
V
uniform
UB
VLB
≤ 1
12(2− 4 log(32 )− 2(log( 32 ))2)
≈ 5
3
. (68)
Proof: See Appendix F.
2) δ ≤  regime: We then compare the gap between the lower bound VLB and the upper bound V LapUB in the regime δ ≤ 
as → 0.
Corollary 14. For the cost function L(k) = |k|, in the regime δ ≤ , we have
lim
→0
V
Lap
UB
VLB
≤ 1
1− 2 log 32
≈ 5.29. (69)
Proof: See Appendix G.
Corollary 15. For the cost function L(k) = k2, in the regime  ≤ δ, we have
lim
δ→0
V
Lap
UB
VLB
≤ 2
(2− 4 log(32 )− 2(log( 32 ))2)
≈ 40. (70)
Proof: See Appendix H.
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V. (, δ)-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN THE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SETTING
In this section we consider the (, δ)-differential privacy in the multi-dimensional setting, where the query output has multiple
components and the global sensitivity ∆ is defined as the maximum `1 norm of the difference of the query outputs over two
neighboring datasets.
Let d be the dimension of the query output. Hence, the query output q(D) ∈ Zd. Let P be the probability mass function of
the additive noise over the domain Zd. Then the (, δ)-differential privacy constraint on P in the multi-dimensional setting is
that
PS ≤ PS+v + δ, ∀S ⊂ Zd,v ∈ Zd, ‖v‖1 ≤ ∆. (71)
Consider a cost function L(·) : Zd → R, which is a function of the added noise X . Our goal is to minimize the expectation
of the cost subject to the (, δ)-differential privacy constraint (71):
V ∗ := min
P
∑
v∈Zd
L(v)P(v) (72)
subject to PS ≤ PS+v + δ, ∀S ⊂ Zd,v ∈ Zd, ‖v‖1 ≤ ∆.
A. (0, δ)-differential privacy
We first consider the simple case when  = 0, i.e., (0, δ)-differential privacy. The (0, δ)-differential privacy constraint
requires that the total variation of the conditional probability distributions of the query output for neighboring datasets should
be bounded by δ.
In the differential privacy constraint (71), by choosing the subset
S = Smk := {(i1, i2, . . . , id) ∈ Zd | im ≥ k} (73)
for k ∈ N, m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}, and choosing v such that only one compoment is ∆ and all other components are zero, we see
that the noise probability distribution P must satisfy the constraints∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd:k≤im≤k+∆−1
P(i1, i2, . . . , id) ≤ δ, ∀k ∈ N,∀m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}. (74)
To avoid integer-rounding issues, we assume that 12δ is an integer.
1) Lower Bound on V ∗: We relax the constraint (71) by choosing S to be Smk and choosing v such that only one compoment
is ∆ and all other components are zero. Then we get a relaxed linear program, the solution of which is a lower bound for V ∗.
More precisely,
V ∗ ≥ VLB := min
∑
i∈Zd
P(i)L(i) (75)
such that P(i) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Zd∑
i∈Zd
P(i) ≥ 1∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd:k≤im≤k+∆−1
P(i1, i2, . . . , id) ≤ δ, ∀k ∈ N,∀m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}.
Theorem 16. In the case L(i) = ‖i‖1,∀i ∈ Zd, we have
VLB ≥ d∆
4δ
− ∆− 1
2
d. (76)
Proof: See Appendix I.
Theorem 17. In the case L(i) = ‖i‖22 =
∑d
m=1 i
2
m,∀i = (i1, . . . , id) ∈ Zd, we have
VLB ≥ d∆
2
12δ2
+ (
1
∆
− 1)d∆
2
4δ
+
1−∆
2
d+
d∆2
6
. (77)
Proof: See Appendix J.
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2) Uniform Noise Mechanism in the Multi-Dimensional Setting: Consider the noise with the uniform probability distribution:
P(i1, i2, . . . , id) =
{
δd
∆d
−∆2δ ≤ im ≤ ∆2δ − 1,∀m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}
0 otherwise
(78)
It is readily verified that this noise probability distribution satisfies the (0, δ) differential privacy constraint (71). Therefore,
an upper bound for V ∗ is
Theorem 18.
V ∗ ≤ VUB ,
∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd | − ∆2δ≤im≤ ∆2δ−1,∀m∈{1,2,...,d}
δd
∆d
L(i1, i2, . . . , id). (79)
Corollary 19. In the case L(i) = ‖i‖1,∀i ∈ Zd, we have
VUB =
d∆
4δ
. (80)
Proof:
VUB =
∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd | − ∆2δ≤im≤ ∆2δ−1,∀m∈{1,2,...,d}
δd
∆d
L(i1, i2, . . . , id) (81)
=
∆
2δ−1∑
i1=− ∆2δ
· · ·
∆
2δ−1∑
id=− ∆2δ
δd
∆d
(|i1|+ · · ·+ |id|) (82)
= d
∆
2δ−1∑
i1=− ∆2δ
· · ·
∆
2δ−1∑
id=− ∆2δ
δd
∆d
|i1| (83)
= d
(
∆
δ
)d−1 ∆2δ−1∑
i1=− ∆2δ
δd
∆d
|i1| (84)
= d
(
∆
δ
)d−1
δd
∆d
(
(1 + ∆2δ )
∆
2δ
2
+
∆
2δ (
∆
2δ − 1)
2
)
(85)
=
d∆
4δ
. (86)
Corollary 20. In the case L(i) = ‖i‖22 ,
∑d
m=1 i
2
m,∀i = (i1, . . . , id) ∈ Zd, we have
VUB =
d∆2
12δ2
+
d
6
. (87)
Proof:
VUB =
∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd | − ∆2δ≤im≤ ∆2δ−1,∀m∈{1,2,...,d}
δd
∆d
L(i1, i2, . . . , id) (88)
=
∆
2δ−1∑
i1=− ∆2δ
· · ·
∆
2δ−1∑
id=− ∆2δ
δd
∆d
(|i1|2 + · · ·+ |id|2) (89)
= d
∆
2δ−1∑
i1=− ∆2δ
· · ·
∆
2δ−1∑
id=− ∆2δ
δd
∆d
|i1|2 (90)
= d
(
∆
δ
)d−1 ∆2δ−1∑
i1=− ∆2δ
δd
∆d
|i1|2 (91)
= d
(
∆
δ
)d−1
δd
∆d
(
∆
2δ (1 +
∆
2δ )(
∆
δ + 1)
6
+
( ∆2δ − 1) ∆2δ (∆δ − 1)
6
)
(92)
=
d∆2
12δ2
+
d
6
. (93)
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3) Comparison of Lower Bound and Upper Bound for `1 Cost Function :
Corollary 21. For the cost function L(i) = ‖i‖1,
VLB ≥ d∆
4δ
− ∆− 1
2
d, (94)
VUB =
d∆
4δ
, (95)
and thus the additive gap
VUB − VLB ≤ ∆− 1
2
d, (96)
which is a constant independent of δ.
In the case that ∆ = 1, the additive gap ∆−12 d is zero, and thus VLB = VUB .
Corollary 22. For the cost function L(i) = ‖i‖1, if ∆ = 1, then
V ∗ = VUB = VLB =
d∆
4δ
, (97)
and thus the uniform noise mechanism is optimal in this setting.
Corollary 23. For the cost function L(i) = ‖i‖22,
VLB ≥ d∆
2
12δ2
+ (
1
∆
− 1)d∆
2
4δ
+
1−∆
2
d+
d∆2
6
, (98)
VUB =
d∆2
12δ2
+
d
6
, (99)
and thus
lim
δ→0
VUB
VLB
= 1. (100)
In the case that ∆ = 1,
VLB ≥ d
12δ2
+
d
6
= VUB , (101)
and thus VLB = VUB .
Corollary 24. For the cost function L(i) = ‖i‖22, if ∆ = 1, then
V ∗ = VUB = VLB =
d
12δ2
+
d
6
, (102)
and thus the uniform noise mechanism is optimal in this setting.
B. (, δ)-differential privacy
The (, δ)-differential privacy constraint on the probability mass function P in the multi-dimensional setting is that
PS ≤ ePS+v + δ, ∀S ⊂ Zd,v ∈ Zd, ‖v‖1 ≤ ∆. (103)
We relax this constraint by choosing S to be Smk and choosing v such that only one component is ∆ and all other components
are zero. Then we get a relaxed linear program, the solution of which is a lower bound for V ∗. More precisely,
V ∗ ≥ VLB := min
∑
i∈Zd
P(i)L(i) (104)
such that P(i) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Zd∑
i∈Zd
P(i) ≥ 1
∀k ∈ N,∀m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd:k≤im≤k+∆−1
P(i1, i2, . . . , id)− (e − 1)
∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd:im≥k+∆
P(i1, i2, . . . , id) ≤ δ.
We are interested in characterizing V ∗ for the `1 and `2 cost functions in the high privacy regime when (, δ)→ (0, 0).
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1) Lower Bound for `1 Cost Function: The dual linear program of (104) for `1 cost function L(i) = ‖i‖1 is that
VLB := max µ− δ
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
(105)
(106)
such that y(1)i1 , y
(2)
i2
, . . . , y
(d)
id
≥ 0,∀i1 ∈ Z, i2 ∈ Z, . . . , id ∈ Z (107)
µ−
∑
i1∈[k1−∆+1,k1]
y
(1)
i1
+ (e − 1)
∑
i1≤k1−∆
y
(1)
i1
− · · · −
∑
id∈[kd−∆+1,kd]
y
(d)
id
+ (e − 1)
∑
id≤kd−∆
y
(d)
id
≤ |k1|+ |k2|+ · · ·+ |kd|,∀(k1, . . . , kd) ∈ Zd. (108)
Given the parameters (, δ), let β = max(, δ). Since (β, β)-differential privacy is a relaxed version of (, δ)-differential
privacy, in the above dual program we can replace both  and δ by β, and the optimal value of the objecitve function will still
be a lower bound of V ∗. More precisely,
V ∗ ≥ V ′LB := max µ− β
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
(109)
(110)
such that y(1)i1 , y
(2)
i2
, . . . , y
(d)
id
≥ 0,∀i1 ∈ Z, i2 ∈ Z, . . . , id ∈ Z (111)
µ−
∑
i1∈[k1−∆+1,k1]
y
(1)
i1
+ (eβ − 1)
∑
i1≤k1−∆
y
(1)
i1
− · · · −
∑
id∈[kd−∆+1,kd]
y
(d)
id
+ (eβ − 1)
∑
id≤kd−∆
y
(d)
id
≤ |k1|+ |k2|+ · · ·+ |kd|,∀(k1, . . . , kd) ∈ Zd. (112)
Theorem 25. For the `1 cost function,
lim
max(,δ)→0
V ′LB
d∆
max(,δ)
≥ log 9
8
≈ 0.1178 (113)
Proof: See Appendix K.
Similarly, for the `2 cost function, we have the lower bound
V ∗ ≥ V ′LB := max µ− β
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
(114)
(115)
such that y(1)i1 , y
(2)
i2
, . . . , y
(d)
id
≥ 0,∀i1 ∈ Z, i2 ∈ Z, . . . , id ∈ Z (116)
µ−
∑
i1∈[k1−∆+1,k1]
y
(1)
i1
+ (eβ − 1)
∑
i1≤k1−∆
y
(1)
i1
− · · · −
∑
id∈[kd−∆+1,kd]
y
(d)
id
+ (eβ − 1)
∑
id≤kd−∆
y
(d)
id
≤ |k1|2 + |k2|2 + · · ·+ |kd|2,∀(k1, . . . , kd) ∈ Zd. (117)
Theorem 26. For the `2 cost function,
lim
max(,δ)→0
V ′LB
d∆2
β2
≥ 0.0177. (118)
Proof: See Appendix L.
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2) Upper Bounds: Uniform Noise Mechanism and Discrete Laplacian Mechanism: Since (0, δ)-differential privacy implies
(, δ)-differential privacy and we have shown that the uniform noise mechanism defined in (78) satisfies (0, δ)-differential
privacy, an upper bound for V ∗ for the `1 cost function is
V ∗ ≤ V uniformUB =
d∆
4δ
(119)
by Corollary 19.
In addition, (, 0)-differential privacy also implies (, δ)-differential privacy, and the discrete Laplacian mechanism satisfies
(, 0)-differential privacy. Consider the discrete Laplacian mechanism in the multi-dimensional setting with probability mass
function P defined as
P(i1, i2, . . . , id) =
(
1− λ
1 + λ
)d
λ|i1|+|i2|+···+|id|,∀(i1, . . . , id) ∈ Zd, (120)
where λ , e− ∆ .
The corresponding cost achieved by Laplacian mechanism for the `1 cost function is
V
Lap
UB =
∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd
(
1− λ
1 + λ
)d
λ|i1|+|i2|+···+|id|(|i1|+ |i2|+ · · ·+ |id|) (121)
=
2dλ
1− λ2 (122)
=
2de−

∆
1− e−2 ∆ (123)
= Θ(
d∆

), (124)
as → 0.
Similarly, for the `2 cost function, we have
V uniformUB =
d∆2
12δ2
+
d
6
, (125)
and
V
Lap
UB =
∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd
(
1− λ
1 + λ
)d
λ|i1|+|i2|+···+|id|(|i1|2 + |i2|2 + · · ·+ |id|2) (126)
=
2dλ
(1− λ)2 (127)
= Θ(
2d∆2
2
). (128)
3) Comparison of Lower Bound and Upper Bounds: Compare the lower bound in Theorem 25 and the upper bounds (119)
and (124), and we conclude that for the `1 cost function, the multiplicative gap between the upper bound and lower bound is
upper bounded by a constant as (, δ)→ (0, 0). More precisely,
Corollary 27. For the `1 cost function, we have
V ′LB ≤ V ∗ ≤ min(V uniformUB , V LapUB ), (129)
and as (, δ)→ (0, 0),
lim
(,δ)→(0,0)
min(V
uniform
UB , V
Lap
UB )
V ′LB
≤ 1
log 98
≈ 8.49 (130)
Similarly, for the `2 cost function, we have
Corollary 28. For the `2 cost function, we have
V ′LB ≤ V ∗ ≤ min(V uniformUB , V LapUB ), (131)
and as (, δ)→ (0, 0),
lim
(,δ)→(0,0)
min(V
uniform
UB , V
Lap
UB )
V ′LB
≤ 2
0.0177
≈ 113. (132)
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof of Theorem 2 : Consider a feasible solution to the optimization problem (25) with primal variables
pk =
{
δ k = 1 + i∆, for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 12δ − 1
0 otherwise
(133)
The corresponding value of the objective function is
2δ
1
2δ−1∑
i=0
L(1 + i∆). (134)
Therefore,
VLB ≤ 2δ
1
2δ−1∑
i=0
L(1 + i∆). (135)
We claim that the above primal variables are the optimal solution. We prove this claim by constructing the corresponding dual
variables.
Associating dual variables µ with the constraint in (26), yk with the constraint in (27), we have the dual linear program:
VLB = max µ− 2δ
∞∑
k=0
yk
such that µ ≥ 0, yk ≥ 0,∀k ∈ N, (136)
1
2
µ− y0 ≤ 0, (137)
µ−
k∑
i=max(0,k−∆+1)
yk ≤ L(k),∀k ≥ 1. (138)
The complementary slackness conditions require that
µ− y0 − y1 = L(1), (139)
µ−
1+k∆∑
i=2+(k−1)∆
yk = L(1 + k∆), for k = 1, 2, . . . , 1
2δ
− 1, (140)
yk = 0,∀k ≥ ( 1
2δ
− 1)∆ + 2. (141)
Consider the following dual variables:
µ = L(1 + ∆
2δ
), (142)
yk = 0,∀k ≥ ( 1
2δ
− 1)∆ + 2, (143)
yk = L(k + ∆)− L(k + ∆− 1) + y(k + ∆),∀2 ≤ k ≤ ( 1
2δ
− 1)∆ + 1, (144)
y1 =
1
2δ∑
i=1
(L(1 + i∆)− L(i∆)) ≥ 0, (145)
y0 = µ− L(1)− y1 = L(1 + ∆
2δ
)− L(1)−
1
2δ∑
i=1
(L(1 + i∆)− L(i∆)) ≥ 0. (146)
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It is easy to verify that these dual variables satisfy the constraints of the dual linear program, and the value of the objective
function is
µ− 2δ
+∞∑
k=0
yk =µ− 2δ
1
2δ−1∑
i=0
(µ− L(1 + i∆)) (147)
=2δ
1
2δ−1∑
i=0
L(1 + i∆). (148)
Therefore, by weak duality we have
VLB ≥ 2δ
1
2δ−1∑
i=0
L(1 + i∆). (149)
Due to (135), we conclude
VLB = 2δ
1
2δ−1∑
i=0
L(1 + i∆). (150)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF COROLLARY 5
Proof of Corollary 5: First we compute the lower bound VLB via
VLB = 2
1
2δ−1∑
i=0
δL(1 + i∆) (151)
= 2δ
1
2δ−1∑
i=0
(1 + i∆)2 (152)
= 2δ
1
2δ−1∑
i=0
(1 + 2i∆ + i2∆2) (153)
= 2δ(
1
2δ
+ 2∆
1
2δ (
1
2δ − 1)
2
+ ∆2
( 12δ − 1) 12δ (2 12δ − 1)
6
) (154)
= 1 + ∆(
1
2δ
− 1) + ∆
2
12δ2
+
∆2
6
− ∆
2
4δ
(155)
= Θ(
∆2
12δ2
). (156)
The upper bound is
VUB = 2
∆
2δ−1∑
i=1
δ
∆
L(i) + δ
∆
L( ∆
2δ
) (157)
= 2
δ
∆
( ∆2δ − 1) ∆2δ (∆δ − 1)
6
+
δ
∆
∆2
4δ2
(158)
=
1
6
(
∆2
2δ2
+ 1− 3∆
2δ
) +
∆
4δ
(159)
=
∆2
12δ2
+
1
6
(160)
= Θ(
∆2
12δ2
). (161)
Therefore, the multiplicative gap goes to one as δ → 0, i.e.,
lim
δ→0
VUB
VLB
= 1. (162)
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF COROLLARY 7
Proof of Corollary 7: Using the fact that L(·) is a monotonically increasing function for k ≥ 0, we have
VUB − VLB = 2
∆
2δ−1∑
i=1
δ
∆
L(i) + δ
∆
L( ∆
2δ
)− 2δ
1
2δ−1∑
i=0
L(1 + i∆) (163)
≤ −2δL(1) + δ
∆
L( ∆
2δ
) + 2δL( ∆
2δ
− 1) (164)
≤ (2 + 1
∆
)δL( ∆
2δ
). (165)
Therefore,
VUB
VLB
= 1 +
VUB − VLB
VLB
(166)
≤ 1 + (2 +
1
∆ )δL( ∆2δ )
2δ
∑ 1
2δ−1
i=0 L(1 + i∆)
(167)
≤ 1 + (2 +
1
∆ )δL( ∆2δ )
2δL(1 + ( 12δ − 1)∆)
, (168)
and thus
lim
δ→0
VUB
VLB
≤ 1 + (1 + 1
2∆
)C. (169)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 8
Proof of Theorem 8: Consider the feasible primal variables {pk}k∈N defined as
Pk =
{
abi for k = 1 + i∆, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
0 otherwise
(170)
It is straightforward to verify that the above primal variables satisfy the constraints of the relaxed linear program, and the
corresponding value of the objective function is
2
n−1∑
k=0
abkL(1 + k∆). (171)
We prove it is also the optimal value by constructing the optimal dual variables for the corresponding dual linear program.
Associating dual variables µ, y0, y1, yi with the primal constraints in (54),(55),(56) and (57), respectively, we have the dual
linear program:
VLB := min µ− (2δ + e − 1)
+∞∑
k=0
yk (172)
such that µ ≥ 0, yk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ N (173)
1
2
µ− 1 + e

2
y0 − e
 − 1
2
y1 − e
 − 1
2
+∞∑
k=2
yk ≤ 0 (174)
µ− ey0 − ey1 − (e − 1)
+∞∑
k=2
yk ≤ L(1) (175)
µ− e
k∑
l=max(0,k−∆+1)
yl − (e − 1)
+∞∑
l=k+1
yl ≤ L(k),∀k ≥ 2. (176)
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If the primal variables defined in (170) are the optimal solution, the complementary slackness conditions require that the
corresponding dual variables satisfy that
µ = L(1) + e(y0 + y1) + (e − 1)
+∞∑
l=2
yl (177)
µ = L(1 + ∆) + e
1+∆∑
l=2
yl + (e
 − 1)
+∞∑
l=2+∆
yl (178)
µ = L(1 + k∆) + e
1+k∆∑
l=2+(k−1)∆
yl + (e
 − 1)
+∞∑
l=2+k∆
yl,∀1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, (179)
yl = 0,∀l ≥ 2 + (n− 1)∆. (180)
Consider the following dual variables defined via
µ = L(1 + (n− 1)∆), (181)
yk = 0,∀k ≥ 2 + (n− 2)∆, (182)
yk = b(yk+∆ + L(k + ∆)− L(k + ∆− 1)),∀2 ≤ k ≤ 1 + (n− 2)∆, (183)
y1 =
n−1∑
i=1
bi(L(1 + i∆)− L(i∆)), (184)
y0 =
n−1∑
i=1
bi(L(i∆)− L(1 + (i− 1)∆)). (185)
We verify that the above dual variables satisfy the inequality (174) in the following
(1 + e)y0 + (e
 − 1)y1 + (e − 1)
+∞∑
k=2
yk − µ ≥ 0 (186)
⇔y0 − y1 + e(y0 + y1) + (e − 1)
+∞∑
k=2
yk − µ ≥ 0 (187)
⇔y0 − y1 + µ− L(1)− µ ≥ 0 (188)
⇔y0 − y1 − L(1) ≥ 0 (189)
⇔
n−1∑
i=1
bi(2L(i∆)− L(1 + (i− 1)∆)− L(1 + i∆)) ≥ L(1). (190)
It is easy to verify that the dual variables satisfy the constraints (173), (174), (175) and (176) in the dual linear program.
Next we compute the corresponding value of the objective function
µ− (2δ + e − 1)
+∞∑
k=0
yk (191)
=µ− (2δ + e − 1)(y0 + y1 + µ− L(1)− e
(y0 + y1)
e − 1 ) (192)
=µ− 2δ + e
 − 1
e − 1 (µ− L(1)− y0 − y1) (193)
=L(1 + (n− 1)∆)− 2δ + e
 − 1
e − 1 (L(1 + (n− 1)∆)− L(1)−
n−1∑
i=1
bi(L(1 + i∆)− L(1 + (i− 1)∆))) (194)
=2
n−1∑
k=0
abkL(1 + k∆), (195)
which is also the value of the objecitve function in the primal problem achieved by the primal variables defined in (170).
Therefore, we conclude that
VLB = 2
n−1∑
k=0
abkL(1 + k∆). (196)
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PROOF OF COROLLARY 12
Proof of Corollary 12: For the cost function L(k) = |k|,
VLB = 2
n−1∑
k=0
abkL(1 + k∆) (197)
= 2
n−1∑
k=0
abk(1 + k∆) (198)
= 1 + 2a∆
n−1∑
k=0
bkk (199)
= 1 + 2a∆(
b− bn
(1− b)2 −
(n− 1)bn
1− b ). (200)
Given δ > 0, VLB is a decreasing function of . Therefore, to lower bound
V uniformUB
VLB
in the regime  ≤ δ, we only need
to consider the case  = δ. Thus, in the following we set  = δ.
Since
∑n−1
k=0 ab
k = 12 , we have
a
1− bn
1− b =
1
2
(201)
⇔ bn = 1− 1− b
2a
. (202)
As δ → 0, 1−b2a = 1−e
−
2
δ+ e
−1
2
e
→ 13 , and thus
lim
δ→0
bn = 1− 1
3
=
2
3
, (203)
n = Θ(
log( 32 )

). (204)
Note that a = Θ( 32δ) as δ → 0.
Therefore, as δ → 0,
VLB ≈ 2∆a(
1− 23
2
−
log( 32 )

2
3

) (205)
≈ 2∆3
2
δ(
1
3δ2
−
2
3 log(
3
2 )
δ2
) (206)
=
∆
δ
(1− 2 log 3
2
) (207)
≈ 0.19∆
δ
. (208)
Recall V uniformUB =
∆
4δ .
Therefore,
lim
=δ→0
VUB
VLB
=
1
4(1− 2 log 32 )
≈ 1.32, (209)
and thus
lim
≤δ→0
VUB
VLB
≤ 1
4(1− 2 log 32 )
≈ 1.32, (210)
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Proof of Corollary 13: Using the same argument in the proof of Corollary 12, we can set  = δ.
For the cost function L(k) = k2,
VLB = 2
n−1∑
k=0
abkL(1 + k∆) (211)
= 2
n−1∑
k=0
abk(1 + k∆)2 (212)
= 1 + 4a∆
n−1∑
k=0
bkk + 2a∆2
n−1∑
k=0
bkk2 (213)
≈ 2a∆2
n−1∑
k=0
bkk2 (214)
= 2∆2
δ + e
−1
2
e
−b+ 2( b(1−bn−1)(1−b)2 − (n−1)b
n
1−b )− b
2(1−bn−2)
1−b − (n− 1)2bn
1− b (215)
≈ 2∆2 3
2

2(
1− 23
2 −
2
3 log(
3
2 )
2 )− 13 − 23
(log( 32 ))
2
2

(216)
≈ 3∆
2
2
(
2
3
− 4
3
log(
3
2
)− 2
3
(log(
3
2
))2) (217)
=
∆2
2
(2− 4 log(3
2
)− 2(log(3
2
))2) (218)
≈ ∆
2
202
(219)
=
∆2
20δ2
(220)
Recall V uniformUB =
∆2
12δ2 .
Therefore,
lim
=δ→0
V uniformUB
VLB
=
1
12(2− 4 log(32 )− 2(log( 32 ))2)
≈ 5
3
, (221)
and thus
lim
≤δ→0
V uniformUB
VLB
≤ 1
12(2− 4 log(32 )− 2(log( 32 ))2)
≈ 5
3
. (222)
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PROOF OF COROLLARY 14
Proof of Corollary 14:
For the cost function L(k) = |k|,
VLB = 2
n−1∑
k=0
abkL(1 + k∆) (223)
= 2
n−1∑
k=0
abk(1 + k∆) (224)
= 1 + 2a∆
n−1∑
k=0
bkk (225)
= 1 + 2a∆(
b− bn
(1− b)2 −
(n− 1)bn
1− b ). (226)
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Given  > 0, VLB is a decreasing function of δ. Therefore, to lower bound
V
Lap
UB
VLB
in the regime δ ≤ , we only need to
consider the case δ = . Thus, in the following we set δ = .
Following the same calculations in the proof of Corollary 12, we have
VLB ≈ ∆
δ
(1− 2 log 3
2
) (227)
≈ 0.19∆
δ
(228)
= 0.19
∆

. (229)
On the other hand, we have
V
Lap
UB = 2
+∞∑
k=1
1− λ
1 + λ
λkk (230)
=
2e−

∆
1− e−2 ∆ (231)
≈ ∆

, (232)
as → 0.
Therefore,
lim
=δ→0
V
Lap
UB
VLB
=
1
1− 2 log 32
≈ 5.29, (233)
and thus
lim
≤δ→0
V
Lap
UB
VLB
≤ 1
1− 2 log 32
≈ 5.29. (234)
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Proof of Corollary 15: Using the same argument in the proof of Corollary 14, we can set  = δ.
For the cost function L(k) = k2, following the same calculations in the proof of Corollary 13, we have
VLB ≈ ∆
2
2
(2− 4 log(3
2
)− 2(log(3
2
))2) (235)
≈ ∆
2
202
(236)
On the other hand, we have
V
Lap
UB = 2
+∞∑
k=1
1− λ
1 + λ
λkk2 (237)
=
2λ
(1− λ)2 (238)
≈ 2∆
2
2
, (239)
as → 0.
Therefore,
lim
=δ→0
V
Lap
UB
VLB
=
2
(2− 4 log(32 )− 2(log( 32 ))2)
≈ 40, (240)
and thus
lim
≤δ→0
V
Lap
UB
VLB
≤ 2
(2− 4 log(32 )− 2(log( 32 ))2)
≈ 40. (241)
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PROOF OF THEOREM 16
Proof of Theorem 16: Consider the dual program of the linear program (75),
VLB := max µ− δ
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
such that y(1)i1 , y
(2)
i2
, . . . , y
(d)
id
≥ 0,∀i1 ∈ Z, i2 ∈ Z, . . . , id ∈ Z
µ−
∑
i1∈[k1−∆+1,k1]
y
(1)
i1
− · · · −
∑
id∈[kd−∆+1,kd]
y
(d)
id
≤ |k1|+ |k2|+ · · ·+ |kd|,∀(k1, . . . , kd) ∈ Zd.
Consider a candidate solution with
µ =
d∆
2δ
(242)
and for all m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},
y
(m)
i =

µ
d i = 0
max(µd − k∆, 0) i = k∆, for k ∈ Z, k ≥ 1
max(µd − (|k| − 1)∆− 1, 0) i = k∆, for k ∈ Z, k ≤ −1
0 otherwise
(243)
It is easy to verify that this candidate solution satisfies the constraints, and the corresponding value of the objective function
is
µ− δ
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
(244)
=µ− δd
∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
(245)
=µ− δd
 µd∆∑
i=0
(
µ
d
− i∆) +
µ
d∆−1∑
i=0
(
µ
d
− i∆− 1)
 (246)
=µ− δd
( µ
d (
µ
d∆ + 1)
2
+
(µd + ∆− 2) µd∆
2
)
(247)
=µ− δd( µ
2
d2∆
+
µ
d
− µ
d∆
) (248)
=µ− δ( µ
2
d∆
+ µ− µ
∆
) (249)
=
d∆
4δ
− ∆− 1
2
d. (250)
Therefore, we have
VLB ≥ d∆
4δ
− ∆− 1
2
d. (251)
APPENDIX J
PROOF OF THEOREM 17
Proof of Theorem 17:
Consider the dual program of the linear program (75),
VLB := max µ− δ
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
such that y(1)i1 , y
(2)
i2
, . . . , y
(d)
id
≥ 0,∀i1 ∈ Z, i2 ∈ Z, . . . , id ∈ Z
µ−
∑
i1∈[k1−∆+1,k1]
y
(1)
i1
− · · ·−
∑
id∈[kd−∆+1,kd]
y
(d)
id
≤ |k1|2 + |k2|2 + · · ·+ |kd|2,∀(k1, . . . , kd) ∈ Zd.
24
To avoid integer-rounding issues, assume that 12δ is an integer. Consider a candidate solution with
µ =
d∆2
4δ2
(252)
and for all m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},
y
(m)
i =

µ
d i = 0
µ
d − k2∆2 i = k∆, for 1 ≤ k ≥ 12δ
µ
d − ((|k| − 1)∆ + 1)2 i = k∆, for − 12δ ≤ k ≤ −1
0 otherwise
(253)
It is easy to verify that this candidate solution satisfies the constraints, and the corresponding value of the objective function
is
µ− δ
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
(254)
=µ− δd
∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
(255)
=µ− δd
 12δ∑
i=0
(
µ
d
− i2∆2) +
1
2δ−1∑
i=0
(
µ
d
− (i∆ + 1)2)
 (256)
=µ− δd
(
(
1
2δ
+ 1)
µ
d
−∆2
1
2δ (
1
2δ + 1)(
1
δ + 1)
6
+
1
2δ
µ
d
− 1
2δ
−∆2 (
1
2δ − 1) 12δ ( 1δ − 1)
6
−∆ 1
2δ
(
1
2δ
− 1)
)
(257)
=µ− δd
(
(
1
δ
+ 1)
µ
d
− ∆
2 1
2δ (
1
2δ2 + 1)
3
− 1
2δ
−∆ 1
2δ
(
1
2δ
− 1)
)
(258)
=
d∆2
12δ2
+ (
1
∆
− 1)d∆
2
4δ
+
1−∆
2
d+
d∆2
6
. (259)
Therefore, we have
VLB ≥ d∆
2
12δ2
+ (
1
∆
− 1)d∆
2
4δ
+
1−∆
2
d+
d∆2
6
. (260)
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Proof of Theorem 25: Consider a candidate solution with µ = d∆ log
3
2
β (assuming k ,
µ
d∆ is an integer), and for all
m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},
y
(m)
i =

0 i ≤ −k∆
eβy
(m)
i−∆ + 1 i ∈ [−k∆ + 1, 0]
max(eβy
(m)
i−∆ − 1, 0) i ≥ 0.
(261)
It is easy to verify that the above candidate solution satisfies the constraints of the dual linear program. We can derive the
analytical expression for ymi , which is
y
(m)
i =

0 i ≤ −k∆
e(k−j)β−1
eβ−1 i ∈ [−(j + 1)∆ + 1,−j∆], forj ∈ [0, k − 1]
max(ejβ e
kβ−2
eβ−1 +
1
eβ−1 , 0) i ∈ [(j − 1)∆ + 1, j∆].
(262)
To avoid integer-rounding issues, assume that n , 1β log
1
2−ekβ =
log 2
β is an integer. Then the value of the objective function
25
with this candidate solution is
µ− β
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
(263)
=µ− βd
∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
(264)
=µ− βd∆
(
k∑
i=1
eiβ − 1
eβ − 1 +
n∑
i=1
(eiβ
ekβ − 2
eβ − 1 +
1
eβ − 1)
)
(265)
=µ− βd∆
 eβ(1−ekβ)1−eβ − k
eβ − 1 +
ekβ − 2
eβ − 1
eβ(1− enβ)
1− eβ +
n
eβ − 1
 (266)
=
d∆ log 32
β
− βd∆
 eβ(1− 32 )1−eβ − log 32β
eβ − 1 +
− 12
eβ − 1
eβ(1− 2)
1− eβ +
log 2
β(eβ − 1)
 (267)
=
d∆ log 32
β
− βd∆
(
eβ
2(eβ − 1)2 −
log 32
β(eβ − 1) −
eβ
2(eβ − 1)2 +
log 2
β(eβ − 1)
)
(268)
=Θ
(
d∆
β
(log
3
2
− 1
2
+ log
3
2
+
1
2
− log 2)
)
(269)
= log
9
8
Θ
(
d∆
β
)
(270)
≈Θ
(
0.1178
d∆
β
)
, (271)
as β , max(, δ)→ 0.
Therefore,
lim
max(,δ)→0
V ′LB
d∆
β
≥ log 9
8
≈ 0.1178 (272)
APPENDIX L
PROOF OF THEOREM 26
Proof of Theorem 26:
Let α = 32 . Consider a candidate solution with µ =
d∆2 log2 α
β2 (assuming k ,
√
µ
d
∆ =
logα
β is an integer), and for all
m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},
y
(m)
i =

0 i ≤ −k∆
eβy
(m)
i−∆ + 2|i|+ 1 i ∈ [−k∆ + 1, 0]
max(eβy
(m)
i−∆ − (2i+ 1), 0) i ≥ 0.
(273)
It is easy to verify that the above candidate solution satisfies the constraints of the dual linear program.
Define
z1 =
2
eβ − 1 , (274)
z2 =
1− 2eβ∆
eβ−1
eβ − 1 , (275)
z3 =
2
1− eβ , (276)
z4 =
1− 2eβ∆
1−eβ
1− eβ . (277)
We can derive the analytical expression for ymi , which is
y
(m)
i =
{
0 i ≤ −k∆
e(k−k
′)β (z1(k∆ + j) + z2)− z1(k′∆ + j)− z2 i = −(k′∆ + j), fork′ ∈ [0, k − 1], j ∈ [0,∆− 1]
(278)
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and for i = (m− 1)∆ + j, where j ∈ [1,∆],m ≥ 1,
y
(m)
i = max(am,j , 0), (279)
where
am,j , emβ (z1(k∆ + ∆− j) + z2)− z1(∆− j)− z2 − z3(∆− j) + z4)− z4 − z3((m− 1)∆ + j). (280)
For each j ∈ [1,∆], and we are interested in finding the number m(j) such that am(j),j = 0. As β → 0, from am(j),j = 0,
we get
em(j)βekβ(
2
β
k∆− 2∆
β2
) = −2∆
β2
− 2
β
m(j)∆ + o(
1
β2
). (281)
Therefore,
m(j) =
log γ
β
+ o(
1
β
), (282)
where γ is the solution to
γα(logα− 1) = −(1 + log γ). (283)
When α = 32 , we have γ ≈ 1.7468.
Therefore, the value of the objective function is
µ− β
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
(284)
=µ− βd
∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
(285)
=µ− βd
 k−1∑
k′=0
∆−1∑
j=0
y
(1)
−(k′∆+j) +
∆∑
j=1
m(j)∑
m=1
y
(1)
(m−1)∆+j
 (286)
=
d∆2 log2 α
β2
− βd
(
1− e−kβ
1− e−β e
kβ((z1k∆ + z2)∆ + z1
∆(∆− 1)
2
)− z1∆2 k(k − 1)
2
− z1k∆(∆− 1)
2
− z2k∆
)
− βd
∆∑
j=1
(
eβ(1− em(j)β)
1− eβ (e
kβ(z1(k∆ + ∆− j) + z2)− z1(∆− j)
− z2 − z3(∆− j) + z4)− z4m(j)− z3∆m(j)(m(j) + 1)
2
+ z3(∆− j)m′) (287)
=
d∆2
β2
(
log2 α− (α− 1)(2 logα− 2) + log2 α− 2 logα+ (1− γ)α(2 logα− 2)− 2 log γ − log2 γ)+ o( 1
β2
) (288)
=
d∆2
β2
(
2 log2 α− 2− 2αγ logα+ 2αγ − 2 log γ − log2 γ)+ o( 1
β2
) (289)
≈0.0177d∆
2
β2
+ o(
1
β2
). (290)
as β , max(, δ)→ 0.
Therefore,
lim
max(,δ)→0
V ′LB
d∆2
β2
≥ 0.0177. (291)
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